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how can something seemingly impossible to realise, 
actually mean anything non-trivial in our existing 
material circumstances?
Behind this relationship is a presupposition that 
has been at the core of recent developments in 
modal logic and the discussion of possible worlds. 
If we assume that everyday architectural practice 
and speculative work exist in the same world, an 
investigation within the analytic tradition would 
seek to define the existential conditions in which 
the real and the imaginative can be in the same 
epistemological space, be real, and be meaningful. 
How can Lebbeus Woods’s work, for example his 
cenotaph for Einstein, and that of a conventional 
practice exist in the same explanatory schema? 
Within the analytic tradition there are quite powerful 
tools for examining this relationship, from Frege 
and Russell’s use of the existential quantifier1 to the 
work of Saul Kripke2 and David Lewis3 on possible 
worlds in modal logic and Lubomir Doležel4 within 
studies of fiction (applying the work of Lewis, et al.).
This article will set out the philosophical basis for 
considering speculative architectural projects within 
an explanatory schema that describes an analytic 
approach to the consideration of fictionalised possi-
bilities. It will show how the transition from a one world 
schema of considering the relationship between the 
real and the fictional, which constrains fictional arte-
facts to be either semantic representations of actual 
(diminished) circumstances or, worse, empty signi-
fiers that can be more powerfully described and 
Possible worlds
One of the core tensions in architecture has been 
the relationship between the conventional practice 
of design, documentation and construction (whether 
real or addressed in architecture schools through 
practice-based training), and the role of impres-
sionistic, incomplete and fictional approaches to 
architectural design. While the former constitutes 
the acceptable and coherent relationship between 
forms of ideation and representation that has, as its 
goal, the completion of a materially real structure 
in the world, the purpose and meaning of the latter 
is less clear and considerably more problematic. In 
support of the value of speculative work one of the 
core roles of architecture theory is on occasion to 
provide a contextual reading of works that, at face 
value, seem to exist purely to stubbornly demon-
strate their incommensurability with the world. 
Piranesi’s Carceri drawings, Lequeu’s images of a 
gendered and sexualised practice, Constant’s urban 
vision of New Babylon and any number of student 
projects that depart from the everyday, all purport 
to describe a process of understanding architecture 
that has internal consistency within the work but 
is seemingly incommensurable with professional 
practice. 
Often the justification for this work is that it 
expands the territory of the discourse on what 
architecture might be, and that the qualia of these 
projects reveals irruptions in dominant discourses 
on what might be considered real and rational – a 
value in itself. But how exactly, does it do this? And 
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from conception to completion and beyond and 
that the complexity of these relations work against 
spontaneous idiosyncratic examples. Because 
architecture is, usually, expensive and required to 
satisfy a complex array of performative functions 
it becomes the outcome of groups of professional 
consultants, prospective client and user expecta-
tions, regulatory requirements and conventions of 
construction. This characterisation usually holds for 
both constructed and proposed work, but not for all 
types of representations, as this article will show.
In addition, modes of discussing architecture, 
and the complex semantic analyses that follow from 
the non-analytic tradition, emphasise the metaphor-
ical relationship between patterns of thinking and 
the conceiving of and thinking about architecture, 
and in particular the cross-relevance of discursive 
heuristic domains between architecture and other 
areas. These types of analysis, from those under-
taking discussions on issues of sustainability within 
the broad spectrum of definitions of that term, to 
more focused technical discussions on behaviour 
and desires in contemporary culture, as a represent-
ative sample, rely on morphological and linguistic 
matches to assert the presence of ‘architecture’ in 
a variety of intellectual practices. Perhaps it was 
the emergence of the ‘post-critical’ discussion in 
the beginning of the 2000s that recognised that the 
increasing complexity of these bodies of knowledge 
made their usefulness (at a completely utilitarian 
level) questionable.5 
As an example, Bernard Cache’s Earth Moves 
describes a relationship between the topology of 
thinking in the work of Gilles Deleuze and the non-
standard geometries of his ‘objectile’ projects.6 
Cache takes specific care to articulate the morpho-
logical aspects of objects and their transformations 
under a series of transitive operations. The formal 
relationship is complex, as is the fine-grained 
discussion of the haecceity of both the object and 
the viewer/maker; however it is not clear what 
understood within a multiple world schema. This 
is an issue of some importance as it underpins the 
robustness with which propositions may be made 
about, potentially, conflicting sets of circumstances. 
A ’one world’ schema assumes that an open set of 
propositions about the world (including architecture) 
should be internally consistent (or that their inter-
consistency is a matter of proof). If a proposition, 
or in our case an architectural project, is deemed to 
be ‘merely’ semantic, and without a direct referent 
in the material world, then it is sometimes relegated 
to the status of epiphenomenon. A ‘multiple world’ 
schema, in contrast, requires a more flexible method 
of thinking because it requires one to, typically, relax 
the need for a specific overall explanatory scheme 
tied to our world, without forgoing the imperative, 
as with Occam’s razor, to reduce the number of 
complexities within any explanation. By doing so, as 
the argument sets out below, fictional propositions 
are not ‘merely’ semantic, but consistently robust ‘in 
their world’, and in every world the fiction describes. 
We may never be able to materially access these 
worlds, but they are nonetheless logically possible. 
Moreover, by understanding the clarities that come 
from employing logical expression in the descrip-
tion of counterfactual circumstances, the article will 
show that speculative architectural projects occupy 
a unique ontological space that is real and rational. 
But to do this we need to first recognise the differ-
ence between different types of propositions about 
architecture.
Ecce architecture
When we think of how architecture is, how it comes 
to be what we see and experience it as, we can 
ask two simple and reasonable questions: how 
has it been undertaken in the past up until the 
present day, and how might it be undertaken in the 
future? It is a simple relationship based on ideas 
of consistency and prediction. We know that the 
likelihood of there being revolutionary change is 
generally unlikely since the production of an archi-
tectural work entails the efforts of many persons 
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individual propositions, since complex propositions 
about existing phenomena entail an almost infinite 
number of sub-propositions that address the condi-
tions for the head proposition to be true. Because, 
in general, we wish to avoid creating propositional 
scenarios in which the truth-claims of the initial 
statement requires an infinite regress of supporting 
claims, we look for a method that uncovers the most 
efficient supporting propositional chain. ‘All good 
architecture is coloured white’ for example would 
require many conditional relations (defining ‘good’, 
‘architecture’, ‘coloured’ and ‘white’) that support 
the original claim. However, it should be noted that 
this does not mean that the process is inherently 
relativised or is dependent on individual perception. 
Any expanded set of propositions that include the 
terms above will, on the contrary, work to demon-
strate the applicability of the head (sometimes caller 
‘horn’) proposition once contextualised. However, 
this process of creating complex propositional 
chains supporting an architectural state of affairs 
can be complex and exacting, though the process 
is simple, if the knowledge base for making proposi-
tions is large – as it is in architecture.
A strong argument could be made that the 
general terms employed in architecture, ‘design’ 
or ‘critique’, actually refers to this very process 
in which competing truth claims/conditions are 
assumed as a premise for a project and then tested 
for the validity. In propositional logic this is called 
forward chaining when we are trying to determine if 
the true statements that support a desired outcome 
are supported by the factual basis of the premises. 
Forward chaining (and backward, for reasons of 
interrogation rather than proposition) emulates the 
state of affairs in which we might discuss the propo-
sition ‘Good architecture is coloured white’ without 
having to laboriously define the truth claims of the 
knowledge base that supports (or denies) this.7
Hermeneutics
It is at this point that it may appear that there are a 
implicit and intrinsic demands the forms make as 
public statements, or in the context of a public 
discourse on their performative value. 
So, for the purposes of this article, if we limit the 
discussion of architectural projects to the degree 
to which their extensional and intensional qualities 
form a component of a domain of discourse, there 
may be another mode of reviving the qualities of 
resistance and criticality, or at the very least, under-
standing that architectural work that positions itself 
outside of everyday expectations of the usefulness 
of architecture and theory continues to be produced. 
Logic
Logic and modal logic are not necessarily the first 
forms of thinking that one might associate with 
architecture. The minutiae of logic as a practice 
emphasises the definition and specificity of proposi-
tions about the world, whose viability is contested 
within the philosophical discussion of logical form. 
It is not necessary to rehearse the component 
aspects of logic in this essay, but it is worth recog-
nising that the examples used in logic are never 
directed specifically at a particular state of affairs 
in order to investigate its qualities qua a subject of 
study, unless to allow or deny its generality. The 
discussion of syllogisms in logic that commence 
from the proposition: ‘All men are mortal’; ‘Socrates 
is mortal’; therefore ‘Socrates is a man’ is not about 
Socrates per se, but about examples of set theory 
membership involving ‘all’ and ‘at least one’. In this 
sense a logical proposition about architecture, ‘All 
architecture is discursive’ for example, would never 
be evaluated solely to discover the truth-value of 
the proposition: ‘that all architecture is discursive’. 
Logic instead is a tool for analysing states of affairs 
from which claims are made regarding the speci-
ficity or generality of their application. 
Indeed, it seems perversely pedantic to 
scrutinise every aspect of a complex cultural 
phenomenon such as architecture in terms of 
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heuristic function of discussion generally, but it 
will also involve the role of fiction and narratology 
in architectural design. To clarify this position, it is 
worth considering the difference between actual-
world projects and possible-world projects.
Actual world – Blur
It is true that in architectural discourse we are keen 
to test the applicability of propositions about projects 
and to examine the logical entailments that follow. 
Publicity material presenting Diller Scofidio and 
Renfro’s Blur Building of 2002 makes the following 
claims: 
Contrary to immersive environments that strive for 
visual fidelity in high-definition with ever-greater tech-
nical virtuosity, Blur is decidedly low-definition. In this 
exposition building there is nothing to see but our 
dependence on vision itself. [It] is an experiment in 
de-emphasis on an environmental scale.9 
On face value it would be reasonable to examine 
the truth value of their claims, concentrating on 
those propositions that intuitively seem to imply the 
most distinct areas of innovation while ignoring the 
tedious questioning that might follow simple state-
ments of fact, the knowledge base.
Yet for all the uniqueness of Diller Scofidio and 
Renfro’s approach in this project, its tangible pres-
ence as an architectural structure within a complex, 
semantic discourse is stabilised by the fact of its 
existence, since its presence acts as an extensional 
referent for claims about its qualities in the actual 
world. Extensionality, in this instance means that 
the knowledge base of propositions can be checked 
(or backward chained) against what is known and 
true about the project. However, we can also ask 
related questions: What if all art pavilions were 
similarly created? What if it were co-opted as part 
of a commercial advertising campaign? What if it 
were the site of an extreme act? These questions, 
while not explicitly part of the original conditions of 
number of naively normative assumptions regarding 
the process of interpretation in the above example, 
and potentially within the discussion overall. Further, 
when discussing something concerned with the 
ambiguities of ‘meaning’, it could be argued that this 
issue is assumed to be clear and flow unproblemati-
cally from these statements. There are a few points 
to make in this regard. The employment of propo-
sitional statements regarding a world do not, as 
statements, need to conform to issues of interpreta-
tion and inter-subjectivity within a discursive context 
of author and reader. I would argue that this is an 
unnecessary concentration on ambiguities within 
the qualia of statements and their extensional prop-
erties, when a simple recognition of their intensional 
boundaries will suffice for the point to be made. For 
example, the proposition above, ‘All good architec-
ture is coloured white’, while rich in associations (its 
extensionality) is logically coherent in at least one 
reading (its intensionality). While modal logic does 
not capture all aspects of propositions, because they 
do not require this level of fixity, it does make use of 
the simple assertion that things do mean what they 
say, true or otherwise. Secondly, the pre-occupation 
with the practice of employing hermeneutic aware-
ness within the act of reading, the attendance, to a 
hermeneutic ‘circle’ that requires the reader to fully 
disclose the ontological ‘entailments’ in the act of 
interpretation, usually asserts that this process is 
a necessary originary disposition to make aware 
‘states of understanding’.8 While there is clearly 
value in self-awareness and issues of structural 
bias, in comparison with studies in modal logic, and 
in fictionality, this seems an unnecessary level of 
scholastic caution.
At this point we might just be making an argument 
for the recognition of logical entailment in architec-
tural discourse, which seems to be unproblematic. 
However, as we shall see, there are a number of 
special conditions for architectural projects that 
make claims on knowledge bases that are only 
counterfactually true. In part this is to do with the 
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make about what is possible. But while this objec-
tion assumes that the final state of all speculative 
projects is a material reality within the actual world, 
clearly many are never intended to be pursued to 
that end. More importantly, value is attached to 
the propositional ‘world’ that the projects seem to 
inhabit and imply through their existence qua prop-
ositions. In modal logic, these alternative states 
of affairs are termed ‘possible worlds’ since they 
require there to be a ‘world’ that differs from the 
actual world, yet sustains necessary and sufficient 
conditions for this transgressive proposition to exist 
and be recognisable as ‘a’ world. So that they are 
not completely meaningless, if this were possible, 
they share some measure of truth conditions in their 
knowledge base that is consistent with the actual 
world. Modal logic itself, as we will see, engages 
directly with expressive contexts in which fictionality 
is a core component of the propositions – whether 
directly in the ‘worlds’ created by fiction (including 
architecture), or in cases of historical revisionism in 
which alternative historical circumstances (might) 
have recognisably changed the present. These 
conditions are part of a spectrum of fictionality and 
counterfactual speculation that both tests the legiti-
macy of the present and the possibility of alternative 
views of the future.
A high castle
A common example within modal logic is the propo-
sition that Germany won the Second World War, 
and that a number of re-appraisals of geo-political 
circumstances would follow. The Man in the High 
Castle, a novel by Philip K. Dick, pursues this very 
premise, speculating on the possible behaviours 
and actions of American citizens in the context of 
occupation by German and Japanese forces.11 
While Dick’s novel is complete in the world it 
presumes and proposes, irrespective of actual 
world conditions, the tension in the narrative comes 
in part from the possibility that there may have been 
a circumstance that made real the conditional chain 
of events assumed and proposed.
the project or the overt intentions of the architects, 
seem to have some form of intelligibility since in 
answering them we will inevitably refer to material 
and theoretical conditions that are unique to the 
Blur Building. It is in this context that it is neces-
sary to introduce the discussion that has revolved 
around the creation of possible worlds within the 
field of modal logic.
Possible worlds – modal logic
When we look at images of proposed architectural 
projects, one of the tests of their coherence, in fact 
the commonplace view, is how well they accord with 
our expectations of what we have seen before. If 
the project is a multi-storey tower, it will generally be 
vertical in orientation, include repetitive floors and 
be grounded to the earth’s surface. These are the 
constituent elements of the knowledge base that is 
maximally truthful. And while there are many subtler, 
and sometimes problematic, means of identifying 
what we expect architecture to appear to be, this is 
a commonplace expectation within the actual world 
since its contradiction would cause us to question 
whether it is possible the architectural project is, 
caeteris paribus, a building. For this reason, we 
are also likely to be surprised by the presence of a 
building floating in the air in defiance of gravity, or 
a building be made of rice noodles when its overt 
intention is to be durable and endure, or to require 
users to act in a fashion that has no grounding in 
commonplace behaviour. 
Yet there is a considerable body of work designed 
to be as transgressive of conventions as possible. 
The relationship between architectural practice 
and transgressive ideas has a considerable and 
well-articulated history that recognises the role 
of an avant-garde, even as a minor practice, that 
proposes works in opposition to the domain of the 
real.10 These projects, implicitly unrealised because 
of their speculative status, suffer the prejudice that 
their propositions about how architecture might 
‘be’ is vitiated by the imperfect assumptions they 
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future patterns, meaning there can be confidence 
in modelling practice that is based on as few condi-
tional propositions as possible. Tacit knowledge 
of behaviour is then interrogated by a network of 
conditionals that form a behaviour tree and which 
allow for counterfactual speculation on alternate 
behaviour. Further, when discussing the assump-
tions and transpositions within fictional narratives, 
the degree to which suspension of disbelief of exis-
tential referents is assumed or modified is crucial to 
the quality of the narrative and in particular its (the 
narrative’s) ability to withstand claims of cognitive 
dissonance.
The existential quantifier and domain of 
discourse
So, if it is unfortunately tedious to try and define 
what architecture ‘is’, the process of ruling what 
may be relevant or not in a definition can at least 
lead us to some interesting questions on the meth-
odology of how architecture exists, or how we make 
propositions about architecture that are true. We 
may also ask how we make propositions through 
architectural projects which remain meaningful 
when they are presented in a context in which they 
imply a non-actual possible world. This can be done 
by employing some basic structural characteristics 
of philosophical logic commencing with questions of 
existence, sense and reference. 
As we have seen, when we consider the question 
of how we recognise characteristics of a building or 
proposal, we can begin to set out a series of truth 
claims that determine the ‘set’ of properties that 
we recognise to be relevant. For the multi-storey 
building described above, we can imagine a Venn 
diagram in which ‘vertical orientation’, ‘repetitive 
floors’ and ‘attached to the ground’ are some of the 
intersecting sets that we could determine. Clearly 
the greater the number of these sets and the more 
specific they are, the more finely tuned and less 
ambiguous is our characterisation. 
Modal logic, then, is interested in the intel-
lectual behaviour we engage in when we make 
propositions that have no extensional legitimacy 
(truth claims) because, in our example, there are 
no actual world referents that can be pointed to in 
which Germany won the Second World War. It does 
so because the exercise makes sense as a demon-
stration of transposition in logic. If/then statements 
describe a causation of events even if there is no 
empirical evidence of their possibility. Indeed, the 
entire narrative of works such as Dick’s, and argu-
ably of all fictions, is based on this premise.
The purpose of transposing the complexities 
of a narrative into propositions that can be exam-
ined for their extensional properties is that it allows 
for scrutiny of how expectations of causation are 
maintained. So, for higher order (more complex) 
propositions the location of invalid components 
of the proposition are clearer. For the proposition: 
Germany won the war and occupied the United 
States, it can be expressed as:
Ǝx, (x,W ) V (x,O)
There exists (at least one) world in which Germany 
won the War (W) and was the occupier of the United 
States (O).
The first component of this, existence, can be 
looked at through a specific term: the existential 
quantifier (Ǝ). In symbolic logic it is used to set out 
the initial proposition, ‘There exists…’, such that ‘Ǝx’ 
means ‘There exists x’ or ‘there is at least one x’. The 
existential quantifier allows us to temporarily investi-
gate a possible world in which this logical sentence 
is extensionally true. Usually the description of the 
premise allows users to isolate and identify compo-
nents of the proposition that have no actual world 
referent, distinguishing between the robust and the 
flawed components of a proposition. For example, a 
set of propositions about economic behaviour may 
suggest that past behaviour of consumers will entail 
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legitimate their premises, there are five questions 
that can be asked:
1. How real are they?
2. How do we discuss them?
3. What proof of existence is necessary for them to 
 have extensional legitimacy?
4. What propositional chains do they entail?
5. What are their claims on ontological commitment?
Addressing these questions requires a clear under-
standing of the relationship between the logical 
status of possible worlds and the rhetorical aspects 
of fictionality they employ. Fictionality itself is a 
subject of study within narratology and one of the 
principal contexts in which the interests of modal 
logic and narrative studies connect. But it is also 
concerned primarily with the exploration of texts 
as opposed to propositions. There is considerable 
debate on the methodological differences between 
fictionality and possible world analysis, and one 
of the more trenchant criticisms by Paul Dawson 
points out that while texts may contain propositions 
within them, they are not undertaking the same kind 
of testing of referentiality that logical propositions 
do.14 It is in this context that architectural projects 
occupy a special space between literary fiction 
and logical propositions since they clearly illustrate 
possible worlds that entail specific propositions with 
extensional referents concerned with alternative 
architectural realities. 
How real are they – extensional and intensional 
referents
In a complex propositional world such as that 
of narrative fiction or of fictional worlds (states of 
affairs), there is a question regarding the exten-
sional expectations of that world. It is important to 
‘believe’ that the apparent qualities of all entities are 
real in their world, and that that world, in the absence 
of information otherwise, adheres to the quali-
ties of the actual world. In their ‘Ten Theses about 
Fictionality’ Nielsen, Phelan and Walsh propose that 
Why is it necessary to think of worlds being ‘actu-
ally’ possible rather than simply understanding that 
they are definitely not-actual, they are principally 
fictional and not to be believed in any meaningful 
way, and need not be considered a possible 
world? The answer is in the insistence that there 
are maximally consistent logical consequences in 
the possible world that may be inspected for their 
congruency with the actual world. The greater 
the inspection and the more legitimate, or in the 
terminology of Doležel ‘textured’, is their claim on 
actuality the more the possible world must be exam-
ined to determine the texture of its fictionality.12 For 
example, imagine a project focused on a condition or 
state of affairs such as the resurrection of Sarajevo 
following the warfare of the 1990s, a project that is 
not known to be possible but becomes so. The orig-
inal circumstances of Lebbeus Woods’s proposals, 
published in Radical Reconstructions, was the 
ongoing siege of the city that he witnessed in 1993. 
His architectural proposals were the outcome of 
ideas on reconstruction that might have been, but 
were not necessarily, possible.13 The fact that they 
did not eventuate is irrelevant to the purpose of the 
project, which is to show states of affairs, a possible 
world, in which alternate outcomes are possible, 
and which contains a network of implications for 
what ‘reconstruction’ could look like.
Speculative architecture – fictionality
Generalising on Woods’s project (and those like it) 
the question then emerges, how is this relevant to 
architectural practice and to the thematic discus-
sions that accompany speculative architectural 
projects? What sort of approach can or should we 
adopt in identifying those qualities in the project that 
are most notable and potentially relevant to actual 
world properties? Or alternatively, how do specula-
tive projects maintain a distance, a fictionality, from 
the actual world knowledge base?
So, for speculative projects that implicitly propose 
a series of counterfactual states of affairs that 
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it is no more of an effort to treat them as accurate 
within the maximally consistent fiction of Soil City’s 
London in the same sense that Dickens’s London 
is the location where the events of Little Dorrit 
take place. To dismiss the images as extensional 
(semantic) referents to an ‘other’, real version of 
London is unnecessarily complex since there is a 
clear intention for the project, as with the book, to be 
read as indivisible and coeval from the existing city.
It is in this context that we must be completely 
clear about what possible worlds are. Possible 
worlds are not present in some other part of our 
universe since they are causally independent of our 
own, you cannot travel to them. Further, possible 
worlds are the consequence of the existence of 
modal statements about the possibility of other 
states of affairs in which these propositions are true 
for that world. They are not the same as semantic 
fictions as discussed above when considering their 
intensional relation to the actual world, but it can be 
the case that fictions can be composed of complex 
modal statements that have extensional referents in 
relation to the possible world they adhere to. Simply, 
this means that architectural projects are maximally 
real in their world (their intensional properties) 
whilst also displaying extensional referents that 
make them appear to have family resemblances to 
other worlds, including our own. It is the argument 
of this article that speculative architectural projects, 
and their ilk, are specifically designed to employ the 
facility of possible-world modality, since their raison 
d’être is the modal propositional statements they 
infer.
Further, another aspect of narratology’s defi-
nition of fictionality, when considered within the 
possible-world model of analysis, is one of reality, 
consistency and logical entailment. Clearly fictional 
narratives employ forms of logic to ensure that the 
actions, behaviour and events of a narrative are 
semantically coherent and that predictive proposi-
tions are non-trivial. But how is this expressed in a 
a core aspect of fictionality, thesis number eight, is 
that there is a double exposure of the real and the 
imagined.15 This means that there is an instrumental 
function present in some textual fictions in which 
the imagined state of affairs has an actual world 
relevance as a non-actualised possibility. Whether 
this is clearly an extensional (i.e. metaphorical 
and semantically communicated) proposition for 
the actual world, or an intensional proposition for 
a world in which the proposition is true (i.e. has 
real referents) is not clear in their account. Their 
example is Martin Luther King’s ‘I Have a Dream’ 
speech in which he famously speculates on a vision 
of American society that may come. In this context 
it is possible to suggest that King is referring meta-
phorically to the actual world and is not seeking a 
clear extensional referent, a criticism that Dawson 
makes.16
A better example, arguably, can be derived from 
examining the complex propositional structures 
within speculative architectural projects, since the 
nature of their visual textuality presents a world 
composed of extensional referents. Projects of this 
form create a reality that inherently presents, within 
the limits of the media, a maximally consistent 
possible world. Indeed, when studying projects 
such as Pamela Tan’s The Soil City, it is clear that 
the imaginary landscape/cityscape exists within a 
world in which its context, Greenwich specifically 
and London generally, is recognisable. [Fig. 1]
In the alternative, it might be suggested that 
projects such as these are complex metaphors for 
an existing, or possible, state of affairs in the actual-
world Greenwich. In fact, to present the work as 
being inherently metaphorical creates an unneces-
sary level of interpretive complexity and inherently 
devalues the texture of spatial and material reality, 
the extensional referents, that the work presents. 
And although it seems something of a suspension 
of disbelief to argue for the presence of a possible 
world in which these images are true propositions, 
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Fig 1: The Soil City, Pamela Tan, 2015. http://superarchitects.world.
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a Narrow Conduit, locates itself in proximity to Shark 
Island in Sydney Harbour, utilising the relative isola-
tion of the island within a major city as a starting 
point for its narrative on a museum of ambiguity.
In this scenario, there are overt requirements 
in the project that it is the task of the analyst/critic 
to discern and state. What is generally and inex-
actly called ‘context’ in architectural projects in fact 
comprises the necessary non-modal and modal 
propositions that ground the discussion, most of 
which are tacit but a number of which are strategi-
cally shown. [Fig.2]
Possible and likely
For complex possible worlds, the task of describing 
both modal and actual qualities within the states 
of affairs can constitute a dependency chain of 
propositions about that world. As a proposition is a 
claim for existence, it is important that the chain of 
propositions avoid unnecessary circular statements 
of the type: ‘It is true, because it is in this world’. 
Fine-graining the analysis of propositions helps 
identify the necessary and desirable fictional and 
non-actual properties of a proposition chain. The 
transformation of modal propositions regarding a 
possible world gain plausible actuality as a conse-
quence of the re-expression of propositions about 
the fictional world that are non-modal. This is also, 
as above, a key point of difference between this 
approach and that of hermeneutics.
The London of Little Dorrit is described within 
the fiction of the text, just as Tan’s Greenwich and 
Sultani’s Sydney Harbour are situated in a greater 
context of necessary properties. Yet it is the actual 
London of the nineteenth century that Dickens 
refers to and which may be described in non-modal 
terms without injuring the consistency of the text’s 
fictionality. This is an important aspect of modality 
within architectural projects as well as within fiction. 
For in both there is the expectation that further 
conditional propositions, how a character will act in 
logical form that captures the consistency and non-
triviality of fictional (non-real) states of affair? Within 
modal logic, this is through the use of ‘possibility’ 
and ‘necessity’. This is an important consideration 
when examining architectural projects, because of 
the tradition of assuming causation (that things are 
designed to happen) within projects. Moreover, the 
quality of the texture of their fictionality, as above, 
can be examined to judge if the causal world they 
imply is non-trivial.
Possibility and necessity
Possibility and necessity, when first viewed through 
the methodology of modal logic, document the pres-
ence of extensional referents that are implied in 
possible-world states of affairs, but without carrying 
with them the weaker claim that they are only 
‘fictionally’ true in that (and only that) possible world. 
In modal logic, these conditions are expressed thus:
□W – necessarily true in every possible world
◊W – possibly true in some possible world
In essence, these quantifiers respectively capture 
the necessary conditions for modal statements, 
including that of non-contradiction for example – that 
something can be both ‘x’ and ‘not x’, as well as 
helping define the characteristics of a possible-
world proposition that we may be interested in. If 
it is necessary that ‘x’ is possible in some possible 
world then we are closer to recognising the differ-
ence between required and contingent aspects of a 
world. Often these required aspects are those that 
are relied upon to be true for both the actual world 
and the possible world of the architectural project.
So if many speculative architectural projects exist 
in some intersection of the real, actual world and 
the world(s) of their making it is clear that there are 
propositional claims inherent in the possible worlds 
they describe that are not indifferent to the actual 
world. For example, in similar fashion to The Soil 
City, Samee Sultani’s Mute Peregrinations Through 
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Fig 2: Mute Peregrinations Through a Narrow Conduit, Samee Sultani, private collection, 2014.
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work. Modal and non-modal propositions about the 
ontologically committed reader/actor can follow 
the same form of analysis as propositional chains 
regarding the states of affairs of the possible world.
Within possible worlds, the presence of charac-
ters/agents implies functionality and causality of 
their actions and beliefs. In fiction there are three 
world forms, or possible world ontologies, that can 
be speculated: 
1. the epistemic world (the world of propositional chains 
developed from non-modal and modal propositions)
2. the desire world (propositional chains regarding the 
desire landscape of the actor/reader)
3. the obligation world (propositional chains regarding 
the performative obligations of the actor/reader).
So the next step for this form of analysis, implicit 
in some architectural projects, is the choreography 
of desires and obligations by agents within that 
world. Assuming that a maximal non-modal series 
of propositions exists for that possible world, the 
performance of actions can evolve from a static to a 
performative engagement.
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the next chapter or what the consequences of this 
design for its host city might be, are of relevance for 
the coherence of their propositional chains.
Summary 
In summary, the familial resemblance between 
fictional and modal analyses of the coherence 
of possible world projects means that there are 
considerable gains to be made in understanding 
how they function. Moreover, we can understand 
that the prejudicial claim that the fictional, or worse 
fantastical, aspects of their worlds necessarily 
mean they can be ignored is untrue. In fact, the 
intuitive argument that projects such as these exist 
and are eloquent inventions provides a compelling 
demonstration of the importance of imagination in 
the design process. Furthermore, whatever trans-
gression of the real they provide, the more attentive 
we are to the chain of well-formed propositions they 
infer, the more we can understand the process of 
their coming to being. The process of determining 
their deep logical coherence, as a description of a 
world validates their coherence in our world. 
Postscript – ontological commitment
Although outside of the parameters of this paper 
given the complexity of the subject matter, the ques-
tion of how ontological commitment occurs for both 
a reader of fiction and for a ‘viewer’ of an architec-
tural project can be productively analysed through 
the lens of modal statements about possible worlds. 
Further, in architectural projects it is quite possible 
to determine a narrative of actions and behaviour 
that the work states and implies. The presence of 
the viewing subject, properly managed, can entail 
an ontological commitment of the viewer into the 
narrative of the possible world.
Speculation on the required or desirable behav-
iour of the reader/actor can be supplied by both 
meta-textural instructions and by the apparent 
performance requirements of the environment, both 
of which are assumed modes of engaging with the 
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